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Abstract:  As Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen develop more nuanced methods against its 
enemies, Kenya has become the principal target of their attacks. Kenya now faces an insurgency 
within its own borders. This article challenges the assumption that al-Shabaab’s Somali 
nationalism and cultural practice will prevent it from successfully extending its authority into 
Kenya.  We examine clan and Islam as these affect al-Shabaab’s insurgency, and especially the 
capacity to gain recruits in Kenya.  Al-Shabaab is both flexible and responsive in its handling 
of clan relations and of Islamic theology. Recent developments in the movement’s strategy suggest 
it can exploit the social and economic exclusion of Kenya Muslim communities to draw them 
into insurgency.  In seeking to remove al-Shabaab from southern Somalia, the Kenya Defence 
Forces thus appear to have opened the door to a new conflict within Kenya’s borders.   
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The Problem 
The killing of Ahmed Abdi Godane on 1 September 2014 1  is an important 
moment in the short but bloody history of the Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen – an 
organisation which has been a major driver of eastern Africa’s regional politics since 
2006. This Salafist jihadi Islamic movement, always drawing deeply on its Somali 
nationalist roots, has managed several transformations since it first emerged as an urban 
militia to defend the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu.2  Driven from the city by the 
Ethiopian invasion, al-Shabaab went first into the rural areas of central Somalia, and then 
migrated south, chased there by its enemies.  Consolidating there to command many 
rural towns and villages in Jubaland and along the lower Shebelle valley, building alliances 
with local sheikhs and their militias along the way, al-Shabaab took control of the port-
city of Kismayu in 2008. Though it struggled to maintain territorial and political 
dominance in parts of central Somalia, al-Shabaab’s authority remained largely 
unchallenged in the south, from where it continued to pose a threat to Mogadishu’s 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) after the Ethiopian retreat.3     
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Then, in 2010, al-Shabaab’s regional impact heightened with the infamous 
“World Cup bombings” in Kampala. Seen to indicate that the internationalist jihadi 
element within al-Shabaab was in the ascendency, this dramatic act garnered a regional 
response, the intensity of which has grown since 2011. 4   Pushed on by a vengeful 
Ugandan President Museveni, by September 2014 the Africa Union forces fighting al-
Shabaab as part of the Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) comprised 22,000 soldiers from 
Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.   The Ugandans mounted 
their first significant push against al-Shabaab in April 2011, forcing them out of 
Mogadishu by August, this being followed in October 2011 with Kenya’s invasion of 
southern Somalia, supported by the Ethiopians one month later.5  
 
Though it would take the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) nearly a full year to 
capture Kismayu, al-Shabaab immediately retaliated by taking the struggle back into 
Kenya.   Grenade and bombs attacks were launched within the first week of the invasion, 
and have now become a regular feature of what has turned into an al-Shabaab 
insurgency.  They made their intentions clear in January 2012, when a video introduced 
Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali as the head of their new Kenyan franchise, to be know as al-
Hijra. 6    Later that year, the UN provided details of al-Hijra’s membership, its 
background, and its well-developed recruitment strategy.7  By early 2013, al-Hijra turned 
attention to developing the war within Kenya,8 with Swahili-language videos featuring 
Kenyan mujahideen and addressing the Kenyan Ummah.  In an audio message of 3 March 
2013, Ahmed ‘Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr’ Godane for the first time specifically addressed 
“the Muslims of Kenya”, urging them to “boycott the Kenyan elections and wage Jihad 
against the Kenyan military”.9  
 
The al-Shabaab now waging insurgency in southern Somalia and Kenya is a very 
different movement than the one that was first born in Mogadishu.  As Hansen, Marchal, 
and Menkhaus have documented, al-Shabaab’s internal politics have been tumultuous, 
with long-running disagreements between clan factions, between ‘nationalists’ and 
‘internationalists’, and among the mujahideen’s foreign fighters.10  An important moment 
of crisis came in June 2013, when Godane staged a purge that removed his rivals 
amongst the higher command.  Hansen traces the origins of this purge to the troubles 
that beset the movement since the famine of 2011, with quarrels amongst the leadership 
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surrounding the role of its executive council, the shura, and the tactics to be adopted.11  
As Bryden12 confirms, the purge saw the execution of leading commanders at Barawe, 
along with 200 mujahideen of the organisation’s Amniyat (“secret service”).13 
 
The purge left al-Shabaab as a smaller but more coherent movement, focused on 
a new and still emerging insurgency within Kenya, and – perhaps eventually – moving 
across all of eastern Africa.  Godane’s purge does not appear to have been about 
theology or ideology, but about restructuring and survival.  It has created a more extreme 
al-Shabaab, prepared to use violence in a less discerning manner beyond Somalia14 - 
vividly to be seen in the “hit-and-run” insurgency al-Shabaab is now deploying. 15  
Crucially, in transferring this to north-eastern and coastal Kenya, al-Shabaab’s actions 
already indicate that the impact of individual attacks will be as important as their 
number.16  Even following the death of Godane in the American strike of September 
2014, the movement remains a potent force.17    
 
 This article considers the implications of al-Shabaab’s Kenyan insurgency.  Three 
questions are asked:  First, how should we understanding of the place of the clan in al-
Shabaab’s mobilisation?  Second, how will al-Shabaab’s advocacy of jihadi theology adapt 
to the Kenya context?  In answer to both these questions, we find that al-Shabaab is 
flexible and adaptable, and that neither clan affiliations nor the divisions of Islam are 
barriers to the movement’s wider support in Kenya.  Our third question concerns the 
insurgency itself: we ask how readily al-Shabaab can recruit from amongst a wider 
Kenyan Ummah?  The answer here is alarming, for we suggest that the movement is 
already accomplished in achieving exactly this, and that it will find a ready pool of 
potential recruits among Kenya’s disaffected Muslims.  Any complacent notion that as a 
Somali organisation, al-Shabaab is ill-suited to this new insurgency is simply misguided.  
This is illustrated in our concluding section, which considers the attacks mounted in 
Kenya’s coastal and north-eastern districts since June 2014 as indicative of the character 
of al-Shabaab’s emerging insurgency.     
 
 
Clans – primordial or modern?    
Anthropologists typically describe Somali clan membership and sub-clan division 
as being a ‘segmentary lineage model’.  It is predominately through this conceptual 
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understanding that all the major catastrophic events in Somalia over the past two decades 
have been interpreted: in blunt terms, the ‘segmentary lineage model’ is viewed as having 
fomented, and to some extent consolidated, conflict.18  Critical to understanding how the 
‘segmentary lineage model’ applies in Somalia are two other related factors: firstly, the 
definition of lineage relationships solely through the male line; and secondly, the 
importance of blood contracts (known to the Somali as diya).   Both features have been 
presented as contingent to conflict in Somalia. 
 
For Lewis, still most widely read and influential among all scholars of Somalia, 
the most pervasive organisational principle in Somali society is patrilineality. Lewis sees 
this as a timeless and unchanging feature, insisting that these ties have remained 
obdurately relevant despite the influence of modern economics, nationalism, and urban 
migration. 19   This reifies the clan as the key mediator of affiliation and agency.  
According to Lewis, Xeer helps to delineate the limits of solidarity in the Somali social 
system.  Diya lies at the heart of this, being for Lewis the central function of Xeer.  Diya 
arrangements specify which family members will benefit from blood compensation 
should a relative be killed.20  The Somali segmentary lineage model thus consists of 
strong patrilineal linkages, firm clan allegiances and enforceable blood contracts (diya). 
This model has been frequently used to explain the origin of conflict in Somalia,21 most 
commonly visible in media reportage that tends to invoke the primordial and bestial 
character of Somali society.22  
 
However, other writers reject such ‘primordialism’, instead promoting a dynamic, 
responsive and changing model of Somali society.  Abdi Samatar is among these.  
Commenting on analysis of the fall of Siad Barre in 1992, Samatar resents the assertion 
that the ‘clanism’ witnessed in Somalia then bears any resemblance to the systems that 
preceded colonialism.  According to Samatar, Xeer was in practice a comprehensive 
system of natural law, encompassing social relations far beyond the blood contracts 
emphasised by Lewis.  In this representation, many clans (especially in southern Somalia) 
shared an agro-pastoralist lifestyle that necessitated they work together to combat harsh 
conditions.23 Furthermore, Samatar suggests that in this evolving system, productivity 
was key to political power: 
‘In fact, those who were not productive, and consequently unable to care for  
their households, had no standing in the community, let alone the ability to  
command any authority. In other words, being a competent pastoral manager  
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or a good peasant was a necessary prerequisite for any leadership post’24 
 
For Samatar, then, there is no comparison between traditional Somali culture of which 
clans were a significant but interrelated element, and the situation today where clan 
allegiance has become divorced from the shared sense of responsibility and order to 
which this system was once intrinsically linked.   Samatar’s argument explicitly recognises 
that Somali society has been in the process of significant social change since at least the 
mid-nineteenth century, driven by increasing pastoral mobility, the incorporation of 
agriculturalists, and (latterly) greater sedentarisation and urbanisation. 25   These are 
processes and trends that clearly emerge in the excellent historical work of Cassanelli and 
others.26 
 
In addressing this apparent separation of clan from other constituent elements of 
traditional Somali culture, Samatar points to the rise of the political movement for 
independence in the 1950s, as a key influence on the restructuring and heightened 
importance of clans. He argues that the clan system provided an easily accessible 
platform for an emerging political class to organise, mobilise and motivate.  All 
politicians were anti-colonialist and all were nationalist: ideological differences were 
absent.  Clan became the basis for establishing a political constituency – the building-
block in constructing a support base for political action.27 As Siad Barre promoted the 
nationalist state, the politics of mobilisation and resource allocation thus turned clans 
into political entities that they had never been before.28  
 
This explanation has great merit in understanding the political modalities 
apparent in Somalia since 1991.29  Government resource allocations disappeared in 1991, 
only to be replaced by revenues available from external sources.  Where the political class 
once competed for government largesse, they now sought to control external funding 
channels and local economic opportunities through mobilising clan affiliations and 
loyalties.  This patronage politics facilitated by clan is bemoaned by Somalis, but also 
tacitly supported by them.  Appeals to nationalistic or religious unity are limited by this 
fact. To outsiders, the configurations that mobilise this system can seem purposefully 
opaque:  but their complexities are defined by modern patronage, not the logics of 
‘traditional’ society. 30  The clue to clan affiliations therefore lies in the local political 
economy within which they compete.31  Gunther Schlee has illustrated what this means 
in practice through a study of the interwoven but contested forms of law that operate in 
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Somalia – xeer, sharia, and state. He shows that although diya payments (blood-contracts) 
have been standardised at set rates, in practice payments vary widely according to the 
power relations of the opposed clans.  In one case Schlee describes, a lesser, weak clan 
received only a single camel in compensation from a powerful partner clan for an 
undisputed murder of a young girl.32  
 
Another writer who advocates the modernist view, Besteman, describes clan-
dependent depictions of Somalis as ‘cartoon-like images of primordial man: unable to 
break out of their destructive spiral of ancient clan rivalries, loyalties and bloodshed’.33  
Through a detailed study southern Somalia’s Gosha, Besteman highlights the importance 
of racialized status, of regional identities, and the control of resources and markets as key 
contributory factors in the troubles that emerged after 1991.34  Her analysis demotes 
lineage, clan and blood-ties as influences on Somali social stability, instead finding the 
cleavages shaped by race, class, region, status, occupation and language to be more 
significant. This is not to suggest that clans, lineage and xeer associations are 
unimportant, but rather to indicate that they are frequently dominated and trumped by 
other forces.35 This broader view of Somalia’s social institutions and cultural norms finds 
favour with other scholars also: Little36 and Simons,37 for example, again both writing 
principally about southern Somalia, have highlighted the importance of a variety of social 
structures beyond the clan.  Bakonyi’s longitudinal study of the limited success of the 
Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in south-western Somalia is another that illustrates 
this plurality and flexibility of old and new cultural apparatus.38 In agreement with Schlee, 
Bakonyi describes the co-presence of xeer, shari’a and state legal systems. Similarly, in 
matters of administration, the RRA re-established colonial structures, such as District 
Commissioners, alongside traditional clan elders in towns, but retained regional control 
through support from Ethiopia. When the group gained local legitimacy by providing 
security, leadership positions and clan representation were still heavily influenced by the 
elders in each town. Crucially, Bakonyi shows the pragmatic balance of ‘primordial’ 
factors (clan, blood compensation, traditional law) with ‘modern’ elements (state-
sponsored clanship and clientelist leadership). 
 
In summary, then, although academic discourse has disputed the dominance of 
‘primordial’ and ‘modernist’ interpretations as if they are alternatives, the social practices 
they describe exist side by side. An understanding of clan affiliation - and the 
 7 
responsibilities that come with it - is essential in comprehending the violence that has 
existed in Somalia since the fall of the Barre government: but while elements of 
traditional Xeer and Diya practices are still present in the current clan system, these and 
other elements of traditional Somali culture have been eroded since the 1960s, and the 
clan relations that exist now are not mediated by the normative prescriptions of the past.   
Clans and patrilineality have transformed to reflect a broad set of influences prevailing in 
the current political economy that work upon and through clan structures: nowhere has 
this happened more than in southern Somalia and the neighbouring borderlands of 
Kenya.  Thus, clan affiliation does not hamper al-Shabaab: as Bruton and Williams note 
for southern Somalia, “Al-Shabaab’s leadership … constructed a very careful strategy of 
assessing local clan power dynamics, which they tried to manipulate in order to negotiate 
their entry into new territory.”39 
 
 
Islam – ‘a veil lightly worn’      
Somalis stand apart in Kenya in many ways, but since 9/11 religion has been seen 
as the variable that matters most.  With the rise of al-Shabaab, Somali Islam is associated 
with radical fundamentalism.  This is a dramatic distortion of the prevailing social reality.   
The role of religion interacts with clan structure, nationalism and Islamic unity, defining 
the possibilities and limitations of fundamentalism in Somalia.40  Religion is regularly 
presented as a feature of a united Somali culture. In order to address this assumption, we 
must firstly ask to what degree there is a common perception of Islam in Somalia, and 
what potential there is for a shared religious viewpoint to provide a basis for political 
action?41 
 
Islam in eastern Africa has been thoroughly studied over many years,42 with a 
focus since the late 1990s on the extent and character of “radicalism.”43  This quest to 
identify radical Islam has sometimes been misleading, often highlighting apparent 
international connections whilst not fully representing the complexities of local Islamic 
practice.44 Contrary to much of the media coverage of Harakat al-Shabaab, Menkhaus 
points out that popular practice of Somali Islam is far from fundamentalist and is best 
thought of as ‘a veil lightly worn’45. He reminds us that women have traditionally not 
been veiled; xeer customary law has superseded shari’a; veneration of saints is still a key 
part of religious practice; Somali politics has tended to be secular; and that Somalis are 
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not scrupulous in their religious observance.  For the most part, the exigencies of Somali 
pastoral life have ensured that pragmatism has ruled over religious doctrine.46 
 
But deeper history in Somalia is not necessarily a good guide to how things are 
now.  Recent events have dramatically reshaped the politics of Islam, just as they have 
the clan.  Importantly, it must be recognised that Somali Islam and its related cultural 
components often act contrary to the force of imported forms of Islamism, although ill-
conceived foreign interventions have tended to enable and justify increasingly 
fundamentalist views. By the late 1980s, Islamic study groups and Muslim Brotherhood 
cells were active in Mogadishu and around the country.47  As Barre’s government finally 
collapsed, and armed factions struggled for key resources, these cells attempted to gain 
territory.  Writing before the expansion of the Islamic courts in 2006, Menkhaus and de 
Waal both used the example of the Islamist occupation of Luuq in order to ask what 
might happen under strict Islamic rule should a wider fundamentalist authority be 
established?48 Islamist control in Luuq witnessed the banning of khat and tobacco, while 
women were forced to wear veils.49  Security improved dramatically, and NGOs worked 
in Luuq because it was safe.  However, the new Islamist administration ran into 
difficulties when the ‘outsiders’ in Luuq’s local authority – members of clans drawn there 
by affiliation to political Islam – were challenged by the locally dominant clan, the 
Marehan.  Menkhaus highlights the fact that the fundamentalist movement in Luuq was 
forced to deal with precisely the same challenges posed by the modern clan structure as 
do secular attempts at centralisation across the country.50  
 
The imposition of forms of shari’a law and the administration of Islamic courts 
featured prominently in Luuq, but Mogadishu has seen the most intense struggles around 
religious and clan politics.  Since the 1990s, a succession of attempts have been launched 
to establish Islamic courts in Mogadishu, often supported by business interests in the 
city, but ultimately opposed and undermined by clan politics and the failure to 
incorporate the key militias.51  Marchal notes these tensions, but observes a growing 
accommodation with clan interests among those who wish to see shari’a law imposed. 
Al-Barakat owner Ahmed Nuur Ali Jima’ale, provided funding for the courts initiative in 
the late 1990s and was backed by many other businessmen. 52   Far from being 
exclusionary in focus, the Islamic courts movement in Mogadishu sought to build 
support among the different Muslim groups including the Islamists of Al-Itihaad and 
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other Salafis, but also including smaller Sufi groups.53  With the financial support of 
businesses and the backing of religious groups, the Islamic Courts movement was able to 
bring vastly improved security, thus gaining ‘performance legitimacy.’54  
 
These courts were initially absorbed into the Transitional National Government 
(TNG) created after 2000, a move that alienated the Islamist faction in the movement 
but at the same time weakened the courts politically.  Following 9/11, a new Mogadishu 
government, inaugurated 2004, explicitly excluded those of an Islamist persuasion. 55  
This exclusionary policy, inspired by external pressure on Mogadishu, rapidly 
strengthened Somali desires to minimise foreign influence and interests and unifying 
disparate clans and Islamic factions alike.56  As a consequence, President Abdullaahi 
Yuusuf Ahmed swiftly came to be seen as a puppet of the west, his government rapidly 
losing its legitimacy.57 This failure led directly to the resurgence of the Islamic courts 
movement in a more militant incarnation after 2004.  Islamist militias emerged that were 
keen to use the Courts as a political platform.58   
 
Until this time, the extreme views of the nascent al-Shabaab had prevented any 
serious alliance with those seeking to build consensus through the Union of Islamic 
Courts,59 but this changed in February 2006, when fighting broke out between the Union 
of Islamic Courts and the factions supported by US and Ethiopian interests. Al-Shabaab 
now came to the rescue of those defending Somali political identity.60  During the 4-
months that followed, al-Shabaab cemented their own reputation by winning territory 
and acting efficiently to oppose foreign influence. But upon victory the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU) was forced to confront the wide spectrum of political and religious views 
then represented within al-Shabaab.  The Islamist influences that came to the fore saw a 
harsh and immediate application of hadith, while brutal punishments were introduced for 
actions and behaviours perceived to be against Islam. These actions and their associated 
rhetoric, including irredentist claims on the Ogaden and calls for global jihad, encouraged 
the USA to back an Ethiopian invasion.61  
 
The invasion of December 2006 and the subsequent occupation by Ethiopian 
forces displaced Islamist influence and al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, but its overriding 
impact was to unify Somalis against the invaders and their supporters.  Although al-
Shabaab was then targeted by US Special Forces and lost many of its leading members as 
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a consequence,62 they emerged from the violence with their political agenda reinforced 
and affirmed.  The invasion by foreign forces had given cause to jihad, opening a political 
space for the strengthening of fundamentalist political Islam.63 As Hansen argues, at this 
stage ‘democracy, nationalism, Marxism and clanism had been tried out and yielded little 
for the Somalis’: political Islam offered stability and honesty, in the face of war and 
corruption brought about by the Ethiopians and the TFG. 64  Within the country, many 
less belligerent members of the Union of Islamic Courts who had worked with the TFG 
retreated into criticism of the invasion, while al-Shabaab and its supporters proclaimed 
that their ideology and mandate was the right approach to the problem. This split the 
factions that had previously united under the Courts banner.  Hence, the Ethiopian 
invasion dramatically weakened the mandate of moderates, forging unity around al-
Shabaab.65 But the invasion also drove al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and into southern 
Somalia, where it would established a strong economic base in Kismayu, extending 
influence up the Juba valley and into the countryside of Jubaland and Gosha, often 
absorbing and co-opting local militias in the process.66  
 
The message of this experience seems clear enough.  Though AMISOM has 
gradually undermined and displaced al-Shabaab from many of its southern strongholds 
since 2011, the political entrepreneurs who mobilised clan issues to subvert Islamist 
control in Luuq,67 and the shari’a courts in Mogadishu,68 are likely to re-emerge once the 
external threat has been removed and al-Shabaab looses its rallying point.  This 
perspective on the difficulties of sustaining an Islamic ideology in Somalia’s politics has 
even confronted al-Qaeda, whose operatives have bemoaned the difficulties of the clan 
and cultural issues that permeate Somalia.69  Accounts of al-Shabaab’s internal politics 
reaffirm these views: the movement has repeatedly splintered as key leaders separate to 
pursue narrower political, ideological or economic interests, 70  or as the international 
cadres of the movement assert themselves against those with a narrower, local 
perspective71 - as happened once again in June 2013.72  
 
A further problem exists for al-Shabaab in countering and, where possible, co-
opting non-clan based groups.73  Small in scale, and often short-lived politically, these 
movements all distance themselves from al-Shabaab, usually because of perceived 
differences in Islamic ideologies.  Hizbul Islam is the most important of these in southern 
Somalia, an insurgent group that is itself wrought with splits and political differences. 
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Elements of Hizbul Islam fought against al-Shabaab in Kismayu, Hiran and Luuq, but 
eventually they were defeated and re-amalgamated into al-Shabaab.  Overcoming and 
assimilating such forces speaks to al-Shabaab’s strength, but other militias with less 
religious commonality have been more resolute in their opposition.  Ahlul Sunna wa’l 
Jama’ah, for example, composed of an amalgam of hard-line and moderate Sufis, was 
formed in reaction to al-Shabaab’s destruction of sacred pilgrimage sites of Somali saints. 
Ahlul Sunna wa’l Jama’ah appeals to the historical character of Somali Islam, rejecting 
globalising tendencies.  They achieved notable military victories over al-Shabaab in 2011, 
and having given support to the TFG many of their members then attained powerful 
positions in the government.74  
 
Radical Islam in Somalia has its peculiarly local manifestations, as well as being 
part of wider global jihad.  Thus, while al-Shabaab successfully portrayed the old TFG as 
a puppet of Ethiopia and the West, they continued to receive backing from locals and 
their clan leaders who perceived an existential national threat.  It is invasion and the 
perceived foreign threat that drives imported and extreme Wahabbism and moderate and 
culturally relevant Somali Sufism together.   
 
 
Al-Shabaab recruitment    
We have shown that the collapse of state institutions in Somalia at the end of the 
1980s consolidated an already apparent trend toward new forms of political and 
economic mobilisation that had been evident since the 1960s.  Older and more 
traditional cultural drivers of affiliation were not dismissed or rejected, but became less 
significant as political leaders competed with one another to secure scarce resources and 
develop sustainable enterprises in a hostile and unstable political environment.  Somalia’s 
state failure thus accelerated the trend toward ‘modernist’ approaches to mobilisation 
and affiliations.75 
 
What role, then, do clan and Islamic identity have in al-Shabaab’s militia 
recruitment in southern Somalia, and, by extension, in neighbouring Kenya?  Again, in 
answering this question an awareness of the trajectory of developments since the early 
1990s is instructive.  The path-breaking study is surely Compagnon, who emphasised the 
critical importance of clan in the formation of the many militia that rapidly formed as 
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Barre’s state collapsed.  Linking this to the use of the clan system in the military 
organisation of the Barre state, Compagnon also noted how the clan became a place of 
‘retreat’ for the political elite.  Writing in 1998, Compagnon identified more than 20 clan-
based armed groups that had been active since 1991.  But these groups were by no 
means fixed: “clan-based political support is constantly shifting”, asserted Compagnon.  
Clan was the basic unit of engagement in the formation of a militia, but for Compagnon, 
“lineage polarisation is a product of competing enterprises and not their cause.”76 “With 
the emergence of new factions and the decay of others,” he concluded, “the interplay of 
clan-ism and political entreprenuership remains the creative force behind factionalism.”77   
 
Struggles were as often within clans as between them, especially revolving around 
internal competition within larger clans, such as Hawiye and Darood. 78   Menkhaus 
interprets this as a longer-term process in which conflict devolves to “descending levels 
of clan lineage” – that is to say that sub-clans and sub-sub-clans increasingly become the 
units of operation for armed groups.  By 2003, for example, the Rahanweyn were 
fighting among themselves in the south, as were the Marehan in Gedo region.   
Menkhaus notes that this devolution of conflict to lower lineage levels meant that 
warfare became more localised and more random, but also shorter-lived and less 
deadly.79   By 2003, factions were profiting less from war and banditry and more from 
commerce and service businesses:80 there were pressures to contain violence, and the 
capacity of clans to ‘discipline’ one another by enforcing traditional sanctions remained 
important.81  Thus, ‘primordial’ and ‘modern’ practices continued side by side.      
 
To illustrate this, Le Sage describes how local interests shaped clan factionalism 
around Mogadishu before 2002.  Here, local business interests supported the TNG, 
driven by a small clique of Hawiye traders, who were all in some way linked to “lucrative 
sectors of food aid transport, remittance banking, telecommunications, construction, or 
management of small beach ports near Mogadishu”.82  The symbiosis between politics 
and economic interests for this group included the provision of ‘security services’ (ie 
militias) in support of the TNG: a core group of Hawiye sub-clan leaders collaborated in 
these businesses and services.83 
 
This pattern of local interests shifted once again from 2006, with the occupying 
forces of Ethiopia generating a reaction among Somali clans that restored greater unity 
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and led to consolidation.  This was both a political reaction against foreign incursion, and 
a rally to religion – with the defence of Islam being stressed in a resurgence of Sufi 
movements.84   Prior to this invasion, because of the restoration of law and order in and 
around Mogadishu and the improvement of conditions for commerce, the Islamic 
Courts Union had won wide support from war-weary Somalis even though they did not 
embrace radical Islam.  But this improvement in security was then undermined by 
squabbles within the ICU, with Hawiye clan interests being pitted against the politics of 
both Islamist moderates and the ‘confrontational jihadists’ and Salafis of the al-Shabaab 
militia.85  Radical religion and clan interests did not sit easily together, but the immediacy 
of the Ethiopia threat drove a growing number of younger recruits into the arms of the 
militants such as al-Shabaab regardless of clan affiliations. 
 
Roland Marchal provides the most extensive discussion of al-Shabaab 
recruitment, his findings echoing the view that neither clan nor theology are as important 
as we may suppose.86  His account stresses the importance of securing young recruits, 
but of the avoidance of doctrinal teachings at an early stage.  Disaffected and dislocated 
youth – those orphaned, or with displaced families – feature prominently.  It has often 
been argued that al-Shabaab exploits clan divisions to gain recruits, Marchal tells us, 
particularly by taking the part of lesser sub-clans or sub-sub-clans – what have been 
termed ‘minority” clans.  Marchal challenges the negative implications of this, pointing 
out that such clans are also often those who struggle to capitalise in Somalia’s war 
economy.  Disadvantage and marginalisation again emerge as key elements in al-
Shabaab’s relationship with such clans; and even within larger clans, such as the 
Rahanweyn, al-Shabaab recruitment has succeeded in drawing in those who are excluded 
from mainstream patronage and support.  And in terms of religion, Marchal reminds us 
that in war-torn Somalia many people turn to religion for solace in troubled times: 
among al-Shabaab’s affiliates are many “born again jihadis” – young men of no particular 
education or religious persuasion, but men cast adrift by the dislocations of war and 
looking for a spiritual anchor.  Lastly, though coercion has been used by al-Shabaab at 
times of crises,87 it is not a strategy they generally advocate.88  Overall, then, Marchal’s 
account of al-Shabaab recruitment tell us that they adopt a flexible and responsive 
strategy, taking recruits from where they can best be found, and placing social and 
economic factors above clan and religion.      
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It is also helpful to consider how this might relate to the wider literature on 
recruitment to radical and militant Somali politics internationally.  This body of work has 
given rise to concerns about the strengthening place of Somalia in global jihad. 89 
Although the key findings remain deeply ambiguous, three central points can be noted:  
 Firstly, it is broadly agreed that there is a general perception among radicalised 
populations in eastern Africa that Islam is under attack by the West. 90 
Commentators argue over the centrality of this perception – whether it is a 
recurrent theme or a causal logic – but it seems to be an assumption that applies 
very strongly to the Somali case, and is strengthening in Kenya as the state 
security forces there mount indiscriminate assaults against their own Somali and 
Muslim citizens.91   
 Second, it is agreed that education, wealth, and degree of integration are all key 
factors in determining affiliations to radicalisation and global jihad: but, there is 
dispute as to how these factors operate.  Is it affluence or poverty that causes 
Muslims in eastern Africa to take up arms?  Is global jihad more attractive to the 
uneducated, or to the educational elite?  Are Muslims more likely to take up the 
fundamentalist cause if they have been too well integrated into host societies, and 
therefore their identity diminished, or do they radicalise because they have been 
excluded by host societies, as many commentators have long argued is the case in 
Kenya?92  Marchal’s evidence suggests that exclusion is the key factor.93   
 Third, is recruitment to the radical cause driven by dispositional or situational 
factors?  The emphasis on profiling techniques in international counter-terrorism 
has led to implicit assumptions that a disposition toward activism can be 
identified, while more variable situational factors (geographic location, the 
operation of kinship networks, neighbourhood factors) have not been as 
thoroughly investigated – perhaps precisely because they require a deeper 
understanding of cultural and social factors.  In eastern Africa, and especially 
Kenya, these situational factors appear especially significant and it is these that al-
Shabaab now seems determined to exploit.94   
 
Even the best evidence collected on behalf of western intelligence agencies in 
eastern Africa now tends to confirm the view that cultural and religious factors may be 
less important in mobilisation than is socio-economic disadvantage or political exclusion.  
The Congressional Research Service’s ‘Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US 
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Response’95 provides a cogent summary of these points, with specific reference to the 
Somali case.  The report finds that among the socio-economic factors, both al-Shabaab 
and Al Qaeda use the ‘victimisation narrative’ to recruit and sustain support.  Within 
Somalia, this focuses upon the ‘foreign invader’ rallying call.  In Kenya, this works by 
articulating a “sense of social, cultural, political and economic exclusion” felt by the 
country’s Muslims.96  The report states that in the places where the Muslim population is 
concentrated, social services have historically been weaker than elsewhere in the country. 
Somalis in Kenya typically express frustrations emerging from a lack of job opportunities 
and a sense of exclusion from the mainstream political economy.  Male youth are 
especially disaffected, a factor identified as important for al-Shabaab recruitment in 
particular.97  Where economic deprivation is most extreme, as in the towns close to the 
Somalia border where large refugee communities have congregated, recruitment is linked 
to the provision of some kind of social service and basic protection.  In these 
borderlands the provision of social goods can be a key incentive for youth to join radical 
movements such as al-Shabaab, 98  especially when recruits might be paid anything 
between USD 60 and USD 200 per month by the movement.  Income at this level can 
allow recruits to provide for extended family members.99  
 
There are also connections between global drivers of radicalism and more local 
factors in the perceptions of recruits.  By linking al-Shabaab’s struggle in Somalia to a 
broader war, and engaging the narratives of ‘occupation’ and ‘liberation’ in Iraq, Syria 
and Afghanistan, Marchal notes that recruits have been encouraged to see themselves as 
part of a global insurrection.100  In eastern Africa this can be linked to the history of 
Muslim radicalism since the 1980s,101 the struggles against foreign incursions (Ethiopian 
and now Kenya), and the glorious history of Islamic rebellion against colonialism.102 
 
Domestic counter-terrorism tactics are also recognised as having too often 
targeted and alienated Muslim communities in eastern Africa.103 With both the Ethiopian 
and Kenyan governments accused of human rights abuses against Muslims in general and 
Somali Muslims in particular, this fosters a robust popular politics that views Somalia and 
the Somali as ‘victims’.104 These points are developed in a more comprehensive review of 
motivations for extremist violence provided in two USAID documents, which highlight 
the importance of social networks in drawing youth into violent politics, often through 
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connections to radicalised preachers at particular mosques, or through family members 
who are themselves already radicalised.105  
 
 
Conclusion – reinvention in Kenya 
This analysis has alarming implications in light of al-Shabaab’s declaration that it 
is now taking the struggle to its enemy, and mounting a campaign to mobilise the Ummah 
of Kenya.  There is nothing in al-Shabaab’s recent history to suggest that clan affiliations 
in Kenya will prove a barrier to recruitment: their pragmatic and modern approach to 
clan politics is well adapted to the situation in north-eastern Kenya,106 where a complex 
mosaic of Ogadeni sub-clans and sub-sub-clans predominate – in many ways resembling 
the situation they have previously confronted in Jubaland.  And, as in Jubaland, there are 
many non-Somali groups, many of them Muslim, in Kenya’s north-eastern and coastal 
regions who may find good reason to align themselves with an insurrection. Nor are the 
sectarian divisions amongst Muslims likely to be to barrier to al-Shabaab, especially if it 
can use its Kenya affiliate al-Hijra to soften the edges of Salafist doctrine in the short-
term in order to wage war more effectively. 
 
Al-Hijra is of course merely a means to take the war to Kenya, but the 
foundations of radicalism on which it is built lie in the alienation, disaffection and dissent 
of Kenya’s Muslim community.  Since at least the early 1990s, radicalisation in Kenya has 
been well-documented. 107   While Muslim politicians have been incorporated within 
Kenya’s main political coalitions over the past decade, this has been done as a calculus of 
electoral politics and power-brokering, and with no understanding of the differences in 
Muslim doctrine or belief: there is little evidence to suggest that Islamic politics is 
understood or accommodated in Nairobi.  As Paul Gifford has documented, the 
Christian ethos of Kenya’s politics is strikingly Pentecostal and often openly hostile to 
Muslims.108         
 
In this context, al-Shabaab’s sophisticated public relations wing109 has already 
mounted a highly effective media campaign promoting the movement in Kenya.110  Most 
striking is their propaganda magazine Gaidi Mtaani (‘Terrorist on the Street’).  This 
Swahili publication, with the occasional English language item, is explicitly targeted at the 
Kenyan Ummah.  Launched three months after al-Shabaab declared it intentions to 
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mount war within Kenya, four issues have so far been produced, the most recent in 
November 2013.111  The articles are well written, and show a good understanding of 
Kenya’s history and the particular concerns of its Muslim population. The magazine 
provides a powerful insight into the organisation’s public relations mission, revealing 
important aspects of al-Shabaab’s recruitment and propaganda strategy. Professionally 
produced, with multiple illustrations and eye-catching slogans, Gaidi Mtaani is visually 
powerful and clearly intended to appeal to a younger audience.  
 
 On the ground, the shape of al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Kenya became clear 
between May and July 2014, in the wake of the attempted “crackdown” by the security 
forces in Operation Usalama Watch.  Launched in early April, this resulted in the round-
up of over 4,000 Muslim “suspects”, mostly of Somali origin.  The arrests appeared 
random and unregulated, and were accompanied by the mistreatment and abuse of 
suspects, the stealing of their personal property, and widespread bribery and corruption 
in the checking of their documentation.  The ethnic targeting of Somalis, and the 
victimisation of Muslims were the two dominant aspects of the operation.  Within a few 
days of its conclusion, in mid-May, al-Shabaab resumed its bombing and grenade 
campaign across Kenya, with an attack on a Nairobi market that killed ten and left 70 
others injured.112 
 
There then followed a cluster of attacks in rural coastal areas over June and July 
2014, suggesting the emergence of a new and dangerous phase in al-Shabaab’s 
insurgency.  This began on 15 June 2014, when the prosperous rural village of 
Mpeketoni, in Lamu County, was the scene of a bloody massacre.113  The mujahideen 
commandeered vehicles on the main road between Witu and Lamu Town, driving into 
Mpeketoni and blocking the roads before beginning the murders.  Burning buildings and 
vehicles, the gang chanted Islamic slogans and selected only non-Muslims as their 
victims.  The assault left 48 villagers dead.  Al-Shabaab’s acknowledged their 
responsibility for the massacre, and then conducted further attacks over the next month.  
On 6 July, two further coastal villages, Hindi and Gamba, were attacked in a similar 
fashion to the assault on Mpeketoni.  Here, the victims were identified and their hands 
bound behind their backs before their throats were slit.  Al Shabaab again was quick to 
claim responsibility. 114   Then, on 19 July, in an assault clearly calculated to have 
maximum impact on what is an important tourist route, a bus was halted on the road 
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between Malindi and Lamu and sprayed by fire from automatic weapons, killing more 
than 30 passengers.  This brought the death toll at the coast to over 100 in a period of 
only one month.115 
 
Mpeketoni had been chosen for first attack because it was a predominantly 
Christian village, at the centre of a rural settlement scheme set up in the 1970s to 
accommodate Kikuyu from Kenya’s Central Highlands. 116  Al-Shabaab’s statement 
acknowledging the attack accused the Christians of having “taken” a Muslim village.117  
Hindi and Gamba were, similarly, villages with extensive Kikuyu settler populations, a 
large number of Christians, and significant church communities.  The attacks have raised 
fears of worsening relations between religious communities, but also of ethnic targeting 
by al-Shabaab.  Given its recent history of ethnic violence following the elections of 
December 2007, Kenyans feel themselves to be particularly vulnerable to the 
manipulation of local politics in this manner.  
 
This was especially pertinent when Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta countered 
al-Shabaab’s claims following the Mpeketoni attack by producing evidence that local 
political rivalries lay behind the incident.118  Mpeketoni surely was a troubled location, 
with local squabbles around electoral politics in 2013 and deep concerns of local land-
grabbing and speculation prompted by the plans to develop the nearby port of Lamu.119  
It may also have been prey to the activities of the Mombasa Republican Council, a 
political group who have been advocating coastal secession. 120   These factors were 
present at Mpeketoni, and may well have played a part in what happened; but it was the 
mujahideen of Harakat al-Shabaab who carried out the attack and it was the jihadi 
movement that selected this target - precisely because it allowed the melding of local 
politics with the broader aims of al-Shabaab.  And in this combination lies the danger for 
Kenya: an al-Shabaab that can skilfully manipulate local politics to its own advantage in 
north-eastern and coastal Kenya, as it once did so effectively in Jubaland, will prove a 
very difficult foe for the Kenya security forces to contain.121     
 
Further evidence of the escalation of al-Shabaab’s Kenyan insurgency emerged 
from early November 2014.   The month began with unsuccessful terror attacks on a 
government police post in Malindi and on the Nyali military barracks in Mombasa.122  
Amid uncertainty as to whether al-Shabaab may have conspired with the Mombasa 
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Republican Council in these attacks, security raids on suspected radical mosques in 
Mombasa followed, with weapons and explosives being found. Of the 376 arrested in 
these raids, police have charged 158 with being members of al-Shabaab. The closing of 
the mosques provoked protests in Mombasa, where gangs of Muslim youths rampaged 
through the streets waving al-Shabaab’s black flags. 123   Next, three chilling attacks 
revealed the continuing threat that al-Shabaab poses in Kenya’s borderlands.  First, on 21 
November, a Nairobi-bound bus was intercepted by mujahideen 8kms south of Mandera. 
The passengers were segregated by religion, and all of the non-Muslims were shot, most 
of them teachers on their way home to other parts of Kenya for the Christmas holidays.  
The incident provoked panic amongst non-Muslim government servants in Mandera, 
with many of them seeking to leave the town over the next few days.124  Then, on 3 
December, a grenade was thrown into a popular Wajir bar and the patrons were sprayed 
with gunfire. The attacking mujahideen then raided the local police post.  Only one person 
died in this incident, but many more were injured.125  The third attack came the next day, 
when 20 of al-Shabaab’s mujahideen mounted a night raid on a stone quarry 15km from 
Mandera.  This time the target was the Kikuyu workers, mostly from Nyeri and Nakuru.  
Some 36 men died, four of whom were beheaded.126          
 
In response to this spate of deadly violence, Kenya’s Minister of Interior and the 
Commissioner of Police both stepped down from office, the government announcing a 
major reorganisation of the security ministries that must face the al-Shabaab threat. For 
the first time, Kenya’s government spokespersons acknowledged they were a country at 
war, that the war was now being fought on Kenya soil, and that its resolution might take 
a very long time.127  This is not how Kenya intended their invasion of southern Somalia 
to turn out.  Far from being swept into the sea, Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen has 
transformed itself into a regional insurgency: it has reinvented itself within Kenya’s 
borders, and now presents a formidable threat to the country’s over-stretched security 
forces.128  The challenge now is to halt the spread of the insurgency amongst Kenya’s 
general Muslim population.     
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